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1. Introduction 
While India has recently experienced an impressive economic growth, rural areas and agriculture have 
largely been bypassed and the ratio of rural to urban poverty has increased. As a consequence, some of 
the marginalized groups in a society that is already characterized by a high level of inequality in 
opportunities and segregation along lines of, gender, caste, and social status, are widely reckoned to not 
have benefited from overall growth. This has corrupted the functioning of local governments with a 
number of undesirable consequences. In partiuclar, it tends to bias provision of public goods by local 
governments in favor of the rich, underminines accountability in the implementation of programs to 
support the poor thereby leading to tremendous leakages, undermining the prospects for sustained pro-
poor growth.  
International financial institutions have traditionally focused on providing infrastructure and capital to 
foster development in addition to support to the neediest. However, realizaiton that it will be difficult to 
make the best use of these investments (or even to maintain them properly), wihtout adequate structurs of 
governance at the local level has given rise to a large shift of resources into programs of “community-
driven” development; depending on the measure, the total volume of lending going to this type of project 
now stands at almost US $ Mn 7 (Mansuri and Rao 2004). Despite considerable differences in the way in 
which these are implemented in detail, the unifying idea is that to empower poor people by allowing them 
to participate in local groups that receive financial resources to implement projects the nature of which is 
determined at the local level in a participatory way.  
Despite the increase in the popularity of such programs, very few serious efforts at evaluating them have 
been undertaken; in fact even the definitiion of “empowerment” varies widely across the literature. 
Without such a definition it will be very difficult to determine whether such projects are reaching the 
desired outcomes, or what to do to help them in doing so. In this paper, we use one of the earliest projects 
of this nature, the Andhra Pradesh (AP) District Poverty Initiatives Project (APDPIP), a US $ 250 Mn 
intervention that was started in 2000, to make inferences on this issue. We are particularly interested in 
three main questions. 
First, to what extent did the APDPIP project succeeded in expanding, deepening and improving 
governance structures of community organizations while increasing participation of the poor? There is a 
possible trade-off between these and we use a set of household, group and community instruments to shed 
light on how the APDPIP has balanced these factors. 
Second, to what extent have women been empowered to overcome social barriers? To evaluate the 
empowerment of women to overcome social barriers, we measure changes that we assume are catalytic to   2 
such empowerment (such as changes in knowledge of, participation in and strengthening of local 
institutions). We also measure the changes in social outcomes of empowerment, such as changes in the 
independence of and respect for women in their households. We do this utilizing single differences 
between treatment and control areas as well as double differences which compare changes over time 
between treatment and control areas. 
Third, to what extent has the project led to new economic diversification, resilience to shocks as well as 
increased levels of income and productivity? We track the economic activities, the food security, and the 
access to internal and external lending, etc over the period 2000-2003. While we treat the social 
dimension of empowerment largely in a gender differentiated manner, for the assessment of the economic 
impact we rely on household level information. 
This paper is an analysis of the APDPIPs success in empowering poor rural women, their families and 
organizations. Section two gives a short definition of empowerment and discusses the analysis of 
empowerment in the context of APDPIP. Section three describes the setting of rural AP and the 
challenges this implies for the project. Section four describes the information gathered at the group and 
federative level to illustrate the type of interventions advanced by the project and how these differ from 
earlier approaches. Section five discusses evidence on the impact, in terms of women’s empowerment, 
access to public services, risk coping and asset accumulation. Section six concludes our findings. 
2. Empowerment, characteristics of the AP-DPIP and their implications for analysis 
Perhaps for the lack of a clear concept and for lack of consensus on its measurement, rigorous studies of 
actual CDD projects and the extent to which they have led to empowerment are very sparse
1. Given the 
lack of a clear and accepted definition of CDD and Empowerment we first discus these concepts and their 
interrelation with decentralization and social capital.  
2.1 Rationale and characteristics of the CDD approach  
Central governments trying to reach poor parts of the population often face the problem, that they do not 
possess detailed local knowledge. While they can target poor geographical areas, they must often leave 
the targeting of households within communities to lower levels of government, whose actions they cannot 
easily control and where corruption can lead to large leakages and diversions. An illustrative example is 
that of the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) in India which is an important part of the 
Government of India’s (GOI) poverty reduction policy. TPDS was devised in 1997 following the failure 
of the PDS system. It is aimed at delivering highly subsidies food grains to the population below the 
                                                 
1 Several recent studies point to the severe lack of rigorous definition and evaluation of CDD (Platteau 2004, 
Mansuri and Rao 2004, Stern et al. 2005, Narayan 2005).   3 
poverty line (BPL). However the Programme Evaluation Organisation of the GOIs Planning Commission 
recently found that of 14 million tones of grain for BPL families more than 8 million tones never reached 
them. The study finds that using the TPDS “the GOI spends Rs 3.65 through budgetary food subsidies to 
transfer Rs 1 to the poor” (Planning Commission 2005). 
On this background it is not surprising that governments and donors seek new more cost efficient ways to 
fight the multiple aspects of poverty. Since the early 1990s projects that include community participation 
in project targeting or implementation have received increasing attention and there is much anecdotal 
evidence of their success. The APDPIP is such a project. The project adapts a self-help approach, 
organizes groups of women, and trains them to gradually make their economic activities more profitable 
or even to move on to new more lucrative activities. To give a few examples: small scale weavers have 
experienced the advantages of buying inputs together at great savings, groups of women who subsisted as 
casual laborers have received small loans from revolving project funds, that have enabled them to start 
trading business and have dramatically increased their earnings. Federated SHGs have formed consumer 
cooperatives lowering their members’ expenditures on staple foods. At the same time as addressing the 
pressing economic needs of the beneficiaries and their families, the project has managed to address social 
issues and groups have formed that have dealt with issues such as child marriage, untouchability, and 
alcohol consumption. Such evidence, however compelling, remains anecdotal. How and the extent to 
which community driven projects like the APDPIP work, remains largely undocumented.  
A big problem in studying community driven development and empowerment is the lack of consensus on 
what the very terms mean. Much of the present discourse on decentralization, participation, CDD, 
empowerment and social capital entangle the concepts in each other and with the concepts of 
sustainability and poverty alleviation.  
We define empowerment in the following way: Empowerment is the positive change in persons’ or 
groups’ ability to satisfy their wants and promote their interests. Anyone can be empowered, not just the 
poor. However, the case for empowerment in development is one of equity and rests on the assumption 
that the vulnerable and their communities do not command enough voice and resources to further their 
interests, even in a decentralized context. The roads to empowerment can be through the augmentation of 
human, social and productive capital. As the poor become better able to satisfy their wants and further 
their interests, the (power) relations within communities and between communities and government can 
change making empowerment a politically sensitive issue.   
The arguments for decentralization are often based on efficiency considerations. The case for 
decentralization rests largely on the assumptions that i) the transaction costs in obtaining and acting on 
information about local preferences are lower for a decentralized government than for a centralized   4 
government, and that ii) information on the actions of local government officials is more transparent to 
citizens. Thus local government can better adapt programmes to local preferences and locals can better 
hold government accountable. By bringing government and citizens closer, the benefits of this 
information can be reaped, and in the absence of too large negative externalities lead to an increase in 
societal welfare. Classic works illustrating how information and adaptability, exit and voice favor 
decentralization include those of Tiebout and Hirschman (Tiebout 1956, Hirschman 1970). 
While serious research continues to focus on the information advantage of the local level government 
(Alderman 2002), there is an increasing emphasis on the importance of citizens’ and communities’ 
participation as a key factor for successful decentralization. Participation is the main vehicle of CDD and 
the CDD approach lends from both decentralization and empowerment. It recognizes that to reap the 
potential benefits of decentralization, the disempowerment of the poor must be addressed before or 
simultaneously with decentralization or CDD. Otherwise elite capture is a likely consequence with 
possibly detrimental effects on societal welfare (Platteau and Gaspart 2003, Ibanez and Rao 2003). Rather 
than bringing government closer to the people, as in decentralization, the focus of CDD is bottom up, on 
empowering communities and local governments with resources and authority to take control of their 
development (Binswanger and Aiyar 2003).  For a project to be a community driven development project 
it must define community, what resources and authority the community can “drive” and towards what 
aspect of development the project will facilitate this drive. Thus CDD projects can differ in all aspects but 
having community participation as a central design element.  
Much of the literature advocating CDD argues that the CDD approach helps improve accountability by 
bringing power back into the local community. However it is not clear that community leaders are more 
accountable than higher level officials and politicians, or that the CDD approach will align the priorities 
of the community leaders with their communities. Like centralized projects, CDD projects are prone to 
elite capture (Platteau and Gaspart 2003). We analyze the conflicts and group functioning to asses 
whether the project has created structures that are inclusive of women form vulnerable groups 
Perhaps the most difficult issue in assessing the success of CDD projects in empowering the vulnerable is 
the measurement of social capital. Arrow early pointed out that practically all commercial transactions 
depend on trust (Arrow 1972). But only after Putnam published his findings on the correlation between 
civic engagement and government quality in northern Italy (Putnam et al. 1993) has the debate on social 
capital really picked up. The definitions of social capital are legio. However the main divide is whether 
social capital should be understood as trust or as networks. Finally there are those economists like Arrow 
who believe, that whatever the term refers to, it is not capital and that the term should be abandoned 
(Dasgupta 2000). Rather than discuss what it is or is not, this paper analyses the way the APDPIP groups   5 
have influenced their members’ in five dimensions often associated with social capital: networks, trust, 
capacity for collective action, information, and political participation. Thus we designed our survey 
instrument to capture group membership and changes over time in the households’ ability to tab into 
networks for credit, their access to other government programs, their confidence in other community 
members, outsiders and government officials, how much the communities have come together to address 
common problems, how much information men and women have on local institutions, and the extent to 
which they participate in local government structures (political participation). We take these to be proxies 
for empowerment. With few exceptions, studies of community driven projects have generally not been 
actual impact evaluations, have utilized techniques such as Beneficiary Assessments without proper 
counterfactuals or have been biased by a ‘praise culture’ (Ibanez and Rao 2003, Platteau 2004, Mansuri 
and Rao 2004, Rawlings 2004). Social funds are probably the most well studied of the approaches in 
community led development. Studies such as the World Banks Social Fund 2000 set of studies in 
Armenia, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, and Zambia address sustainability, efficiency, targeting 
and the changes in living standards. Other studies of community based targeting (CBT) find among that 
household targeting by communities works better the more equal the land distribution and the less remote 
the community is (Galasso and Ravallion 2005). While these are very all relevant and interesting issues, 
still very little is known about the way empowerment works (Stern et al. 2005).  
2.2 Different types of interventions  
CDD projects such as the APDPIP differ from non-CDD projects by striving to empower beneficiaries 
economically and socially, this implies that the instruments used in the analysis will have to go beyond 
standard economic ones. However, this only provides scant guidance in designing an impact evaluation. 
Except for the commonality of community involvement as a major design component, CDD projects 
exhibit great variation in project design and assumptions. CDD projects are found in a number of forms: i) 
single or multi-sectoral projects ii) implemented within existing government structures or creating new 
parallel or supplementary structures iii) focused on income generation or public service delivery iv) 
seeking to strengthen the individual agency or collective action iv)  geographically or vocationally 
oriented, v) inclusive of all strata of a population or targeted to specific groups vi) focused on self-help 
and sustainability or grants based. Such project aspects largely determine which kind of surveying and 
analysis is relevant and possible. 
Like other DPIPs and many CDD projects, the APDPIP aims to improve the livelihood opportunities of 
the poor by providing them with access to financial resources as well as improved capacity. However, 
there are a number of differences between AP and other CDD projects. We briefly describe these and 
discuss how they will affect the type of analysis to be performed   6 
First, an interesting aspects of the AP program that greatly facilitates the assessment of its impact is the 
fact that only women´s groups were eligible and that where possible it built on pre-existing group 
structures. It is therefore possible to compare between women and men in the project area, as well as 
between pre-existing groups in areas affected by the project and in areas that were not eligible, to assess 
project impacts.  
Second, an important objective of the project is to not only strengthen existing SHGs but also to expand 
the outreach of existing SHGs by bringing in women, especially from outlying areas and marginalized 
groups who may not have participated initially due to limitations in their endowments with human and 
physical capital. As SHGs are likely to acquire additional skills as they go through their “life-cycle“ 
distinguishing between SHGs that have been newly established or strengthened under the project and 
those that have existed for a long time provides us with a possibility of studying project performance and 
relevance to different types of groups.  
Third, recognizing the limitations of SHGs in terms of providing public goods, interacting with the 
government bureaucracy, accessing the resources needed to build members’ capacity, and also dealing 
with providers of financial services, the project has made the establishment of SHG federations, at the 
village level through VOs and at the mandal (county) level through mandal samakhyas (MSs). 
Characterizing these federations, their activities as well as the income streams of the household in areas 
with and without such federations facilitates the assessment of the project impact. 
2.3 Data sources  
This paper is thus based on two surveys one for APDPIP (Velugu Phase I) and AP Rural Poverty 
Reduction Project (Velugu Phase II). For APDPIP we use a comprehensive set of survey instruments  
covering 3 districts, 2,700 households (with separate questionnaires being administered to men and 
women in the household), 2,200 self-help groups, and 200 village organizations in both project and 
control areas.  
The control group originally chosen for the project’s baseline survey was small and contaminated in the 
sense that a significant amount of project activity has been undertaken in control areas. However, while 
the DPIP was active only in 6 districts, the project has recently been expanded (Velugu Phase Two) to 
cover the whole state. The ability to design and use the baseline survey of Velugu Phase Two as a control 
group, and to rely on recall questions to assess changes in key indicators and household assets over time 
provides a unique opportunity to enhance the controls and minimize contamination in the assessment of 
the APDPIPs impact on poor rural women and their households. The use of data from Velugu Phase II 
brings the total number of household included in the analysis to 7000 and the numbr of SHGs to 4000.   7 
The questionaires used contained elaborate sections on social empowerment, participation in groups, and 
actual as well as hypothetical borrowing capacity. 
3. The setting and the resulting challenges  
This section uses the survey data to illustrate household and community characteristics without the 
project, using either recall or baseline information, at household and village levels. In addition, 
information based on household data is also disaggregated by SHG participation, to provide the basis for 
a discussion of targeting in section 3. In all tables, we include t-tests for the equality of means between 
the two groups.  
3.1 Sources of livelihood  
We note that, in DPIP areas, households have very low endowments with physical and human capital 
which limit their ability for gainful self-employment. At the same time, agriculture is the main source of 
livelihood and there are very few non-agricultural livelihood opportunities. The resulting seasonality of 
employment opportunities, as well as the scope for periodic droughts, not only make investment risky but 
also imply that the wage labor market may dry up. This leads to lots of hidden unemployment, a high 
budget share of alcohol, and despair migration which further undermines livelihood opportunities. High 
levels of poverty are the result.  
Table 1 illustrates that only about one third of the household heads have any formal education and only 
about an equal share can either read or write. The high level of gender discrimination is illustrated by the 
fact that only 16% of spouses had any formal education, a share that is significantly higher in the project 
areas chosen under DPIP. Agriculture provides the mainstay of more than two thirds of the households in 
the sample. Overall, 28% of the sample are self-employed in agriculture, 32% engage in casual 
agricultural work, and another 15% rely on livestock husbandry and CPRs as their main occupation. 
About 12% of households engage in non-agricultural casual work, and about 7% each are self employed 
in non-agriculture or salaried. These aggregate figures hide significant regional variation across districts. 
Although they are still mainly rural, the share of households that rely primarily on agriculture is 
significantly lower in case of the RPRP villages. This is reflected in the occupation of the head, with 39% 
self-employed, 31% being an agricultural casual worker, and 15% having their own enterprise. 
Households’ endowments with assets and consumer goods in the project area are low, even though the 
reliance on agriculture implies that the share of land ownership is significantly higher (77% as compared 
to 53% in RPRP areas). Similarly, animal ownership is, with about 27% for both milch and drought 
animals, much higher in DPIP than in non-DPIP areas. Endowments with consumer goods are fairly 
similar; about 18% owned a bike, 16% a radio, and 50% a watch. By comparison, the fact that the share   8 
of tribals in the target area is significantly higher, implies that the access of households to sanitation is 
significantly worse than that of households in non-project areas: 34% (compared to 17%) have only an 
unprotected water source, 52% no drainage, 10% a toilet, and 19% have to go more than 250 yards to 
reach a source of drinking water.  
The community survey illustrates that in two thirds of the villages in the DPIP areas, households do 
migrate in order to improve their income. Contrary to other examples, e.g. in China, where migration by 
individual family members has been a very successful strategy for rural households to generate resources 
that can be used to invest locally, this type of migration is generally motivated by despair and failure to 
find any local employment. Especially in the case of landless, it generally involves the whole family, 
implying interruptions in children’s schooling and the loss of local social capital. Since the resources 
generated are generally enough only for subsistence, it does not lead to the accumulation of resources.  
3.2 Access to public services  
The negative impact of limited endowments and inadequate sanitary conditions in the target area is 
exacerbated by limited quality of and access to public health services that lead to high levels of sickness 
and loss of income earning opportunities due to ill-health. Although the overall supply of school 
infrastructure, at least at the primary level, is quite good, it is significantly lower in DPIP as compared to 
non-DPIP areas and things deteriorate rapidly for upper primary and high schools. Households’ economic 
conditions imply that the poorest are unable to take advantage of the opportunities provided, implying that 
they either do not attend or interrupt schooling. This is borne out by the fact that in the project area, 18% 
of households have children who never attended school (11% of them with girls) and 15% of households 
had children who were forced to interrupt school at least once.  
Poor sanitary conditions are likely to the main reasons for households in the project area to have 
significantly higher levels of sickness than those outside it. This causes them not only to lose valuable 
labor time but also requires them to spend large amounts of resources for dealing with illnesses. In fact, 
households affected by sickness in the treatment mandals spent more than Rs 4000 to deal with the main 
event of sickness during the last 12 months.  
The main problems to development, as perceived by women in the households interviewed, are given in 
the lower panel of table 2. The relative ranking is quite similar between project and non-project areas -
with infrastructure coming first, followed by sanitation and drinking water, communication, irrigation and 
electricity, and social issues such as child marriages and untouchability. One notes, however, that the rate 
at which such concerns are raised is significantly higher in project areas as compared to non-project as 
well as treatment mandals as compared to control mandals. To give just one example, 63% of women in   9 
DPIP areas (65% in those targeted for intervention) feel that internal roads are an important problem in 
DPIP areas as compared to 46% in non-DPIP areas.  
Social backwardness of the project areas is illustrated by the high frequency of women mentioning access 
to communication (46%) child marriages (34%), and untouchability (32%). It certainly merits the focus of 
different groups on these issues as a primary focus of attention before turning to addressing pressing 
economic problems and suggests that proper sequencing will be important to have a maximum impact.  
3.3 Risk and vulnerability to shocks  
Given the limited access to irrigation, agricultural income is exposed to the vicissitudes of weather risk, in 
particular periodic droughts, which affect not only land owners but also users of common property 
resources and wage earners. The adverse impact of these is compounded by the losses sustained through 
general ill-health and periodic health shocks and the weakness of coping strategies. Although there are 
government programs to enable poor people deal with such shocks, their outreach, especially to the poor, 
was limited. Taken together, and combined with the lack of these factors imply high levels of food 
insecurity and vulnerability.  
The high level of risk is illustrated by the fact that 42% of households experienced at least one incident of 
drought, a share that is highest in Anantapur (75%) compared with only 12% in Adilabad and slightly less 
than 50% in Srikakulam. The systematic nature of these shocks implies that it will be difficult to rely on 
local networks for insurance and that, because of the difficulty of households insuring each other, macro-
economic consequences such as systematic fluctuations of asset prices. The losses sustained as a 
consequence are by no means inconsequential; in fact the mean loss associated with the most severe 
incident amounted to more than Rs 8,000, in many cases higher than the per capita income of the 
household. Even though government program  
The impact of risk is visible form the fact that more than one quarter of households (26%) in intervention 
areas had at least one incident of food insecurity during the last 3 years, defined as a period of at least 2 
weeks during which less than 2 square meals per day were available. This highlights the importance of 
enabling households to deal with the consequences of fluctuations as a first area of intervention taken on 
by the project.  
3.4 Inequality and gender discrimination  
A long history of discrimination manifests itself not only in social but also in economic terms, in 
particular in high levels of inequality of asset endowments by caste and of economic opportunities by 
gender. The impact of measures to positively discriminate in favor of historically disadvantaged groups is 
constrained, in addition to their low endowments, by the limited knowledge about such measures by the   10 
affected groups, their scant involvement in formal and informal village institutions, and a profound lack 
of trust in other castes. Unless these are overcome, it will be difficult to achieve effective participation. In 
the absence of awareness of government programs among the target population, elite capture becomes 
relatively easy.  
While a range of studies indicate that women’s access to income and assets will have an impact on the 
way in which spending is distributed, a further justification for focusing attention under the project on 
females is the fact that the opportunities of asset-less women in the wage labor market are severely 
constrained and that therefore access to the assets needed for self-employment will have a particularly 
large welfare effect. This is visible from table 3 which shows that the wages received by casual female 
labor are consistently less than two thirds of what is received by men for tasks that are comparable.  
It is now widely accepted that the inability to trust others can seriously undermine the scope for economic 
and non-economic interaction and all the benefits (in terms of expanding knowledge and exchange that go 
with it. Table 3 illustrates that in DPIP areas, only about 70% of women indicated that they had high trust 
in the same caste group within their village, a share that decreased to 37% for non-residents of the village 
and 34% and 10% for different caste groups within the same village and in another village, respectively. 
In view of the fact that only 23% and 16%, respectively, indicated that they had high trust in government 
employees or elected representatives, it is not surprising to find that both the outreach and effectiveness of 
government programs to assist the poorest has remained quite limited.  
Very limited trust in others is supported and reinforced by extremely low levels of knowledge. Only less 
than one third of women knew of the reservation of seats for women’s representation at the Gram 
Panchayat (GP) level existed, and only 6%, 13%, and 30%, had during the preceding month, read a 
newspaper, listened to the radio, or watched TV. In fact, 26% of women surveyed are afraid to disagree 
with their husband. 
 
4. Program institutions and targeting  
One of the basic assumptions of the project is that SHGs fulfill a positive role but that their impact on 
reducing poverty and empowering women on a broader scale is constrained by limited outreach and 
scope. In this section, we explore the extent to which the DPIP has been able to expand in both areas. To 
assess gains in outreach that go beyond the mere numbers of participants, we perform regressions of 
program targeting, complemented by the share of different caste groups . These are complemented by an 
assessment of the governance structure as well as SHGs’ lending and non-lending activities. Examination 
of the lending portfolio also provides a yardstick against which to assess the performance of the groups.   11 
4.1 Targeting and expansion of scope  
To assess whether DPIP has been able to further reach out to previously marginalized groups, we run 
simple probit regressions for participation in non-DPIP and in newly established DPIP groups (Table 5), 
respectively, using as right hand side variables indicators referring to conditions 3 years ago.
2 Right hand 
side variables include invariant household-specific characteristics, the poverty group, housing conditions, 
the level of women’s empowerment, and asset ownership. A number of findings of interest emerge.  
First, we note that both DPIP and other programs appear to have included preferentially households those 
who already had a minimum level of human capital (somebody in the household can read), a tendency to 
participate in other groups, and a higher propensity to save part of which can be explained by the fact that 
even groups including marginalized households can benefit significantly from the presence of some 
members with higher levels of human capital. At the same time, one observes a clear shift towards more 
poor people in DPIP: rather than savings by the women (as in the case for pre-existing groups), they 
target only households with some savings and the coefficient on these savings (as well as for participation 
in other groups and in particular literacy) is significantly lower.  
Second, DPIP has made clear advances in targeting of households classified as poorest of the poor (POP) 
and poor by the Participatory Identification of the Poor (PIP) that was carried out state-wide in AP. The 
coefficients on both categories are highly significant and of considerable magnitude, compared to what is 
observed for pre-existing groups where only the coefficient on poor but not POP is significant. The 
targeting of the vulnerable population is supported by the fact that the coefficient on having experienced 
food insecurity is highly significant. This turn towards the poorer parts of the population is supported by 
the coefficients on housing conditions as well as non-land assets. At the same time, while the coefficient 
on land ownership is insignificant in most regression, the significance of the coefficient on land values 
suggests that both of the programs have been more successful targeting the landed (and therefore less 
mobile) population, implying that strategies to ensure gainful participation of other marginal groups, in 
particular migrants, may be needed.  
Third, even though part of this may reflect past program effects (which is one of the reasons for which we 
estimate regressions with and without these variables), we note a clear difference between pre-existing 
and DPIP groups in terms of the extent to which the former included women who were already fairly 
empowered (in terms of having high trust in others, participating and speaking up in community 
                                                 
2 Note that, to the extent that non-DPIP groups were established more than 3 years ago and have had an impact on 
the  variables of certain time-varying factors, the estimated coefficients on these factors would be biased towards 
zero.    12 
assemblies) as compared to DPIP which truly integrates households where women are disempowered in 
all of these respects, with the possible exception of knowledge on the GS reservations.  
To assess the extent to which DPIP SHGs’ portfolio of activities has expanded beyond that of 
“traditional” SHGs, we compare members’ subjective perception of the benefits they derive from 
participating in an SHG between the different types of groups. Doing so illustrates that the project is more 
effectively dealing with social issues, issues which are of a broader appeal to different sections of the 
population. It also shows that, in the economic sphere, the project’s expansion into areas such as RCL and 
insurance that deal more explicitly with risk and vulnerability, has provided benefits to a greater number 
of members and thus been critical in expanding the outreach as compared to earlier programs.  
4.2 Governance structure and general characteristics of SHGs  
Using data on almost 4,000 SHGs to illustrate some basic characteristics of SHGs illustrates the 
constancy in the number of members (13 on average) and the fact that, with an average age of more than 
4 years, some of these groups had considerable experience. The share of SCs, STs, and minorities is, with 
38%, marginally higher for DPIP than for non-DPIP groups, mainly due to the fact that newly formed 
groups contain on average 42% of members from this category, compared to 35% in non-DPIP ones.  
Although more intensive training, which was imparted to 65% of DPIP as compared to 50% of non-DPIP 
groups, was supposed to enable the newly formed groups to respond to the challenge of such an 
expansion, this does not seem to have been the case.  
The data suggest that this expansion of coverage has been associated with declines in the quality of 
internal controls and discipline that imply that, despite training and other efforts that are significantly 
higher than for pre-existing groups, these indicators are significantly lower for DPIP than for non-DPIP 
groups. For example, even though a significantly higher share of groups impose sanctions for non-
attendance, in the average DPIP group only 65% of meetings are held as scheduled and only 62% of the 
membership attends them, compared to 83% and 79% for non-DPIP groups, respectively. Part of this can 
be explained by the fact that non-DPIP groups that are no longer functional (and where members no 
longer perceive any benefits), will just dissolve, implying that those that are in existence are clearly the 
most dynamic and viable.  
The need for an evolution of groups over the life cycle is supported by the benefits which members of 
different types of groups perceive to be associated with participation. In the economic sphere, an average 
of 43% indicate that the group helped to strengthen existing income sources, 37% point towards new 
sources of income generation, 57% highlight benefits in terms of credit access, and about 9% benefit from 
marketing activities. While income-related benefits are most pronounced in pre-existing groups (47% for   13 
strengthening and 41% for new sources) and DPIP groups that existed previously (40% and 34% 
respectively), they are still modest in newly formed ones (29% and 20%), implying the need for training 
and building up of group capacity to enable members to take advantage of the economic opportunities 
available. Marketing, an activity that was not in the earlier menu of interventions, is still more limited 
(9% overall) though taken on more by DPIP than non-DPIP groups. The one clear exception refers to 
credit access which, with 61% as compared to 55%, is more frequent in groups under DPIP than others, 
even though the fact that only 51% of newly formed as compared to 67% for converted groups benefit 
from credit suggests that there is some selection within DPIP.  
The fact that, by taking up issues of food security and insurance, DPIP has expanded into an area that had 
earlier received very little attention is confirmed by the fact that, even though 36% and 12% of DPIP 
groups benefited from these interventions, non of the non-DPIP groups mentioned this type of benefit. In 
addition to the total amount of resources required to bring about benefits in this areas being much less 
than for income benefits, the data also highlight that insurance and food security are more inclusive than 
benefits accruing in the economic sphere; 90% of those mentioning insurance benefits and 75% of those 
pointing towards food security benefits highlight that these benefit all members equally rather than just a 
few.  
To assess the potential for realizing economic benefits, it is of interest to review presence of the 
management needs required for a group to engage in successful lending. Table 7 reports probit 
regressions for different specifications with both the presence of serious and infrequent conflict as the 
dependent variable. Results point towards considerable deficiencies in DPIP groups. Compared to 41% of 
non-DPIP ones who have books checked by a Master Bookkeeper (MBK) , only 37% of DPIP groups do 
so. The share of groups where the quality of book-keeping is bad or very bad is, with 40% for DPIP 
groups (equally for converted and newly established ones) much lower than for non-DPIP ones where it 
reaches only 30%. By contrast, only 25% of DPIP, compared to 30% of non-DPIP groups have good 
quality of book-keeping. While training of book-keepers should help to address this issue in principle, and 
indeed 60% of DPIP groups have one available as compared to 35% of non-DPIP groups, this does not 
seem to make a difference in terms of the final outcome.  
We note that 14% of groups were affected by serious conflicts -which are more frequent in non-DPIP 
(16%) than in DPIP groups (11%) and 22% by temporary conflicts which are much more prevalent in 
DPIP groups (40%) as compared to others (13%). This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that, once 
conflict is allowed to fester, it is very difficult to get rid off and suggests that great attention to any factors 
that may increase the conflict potential will be particularly warranted. Before exploring such factors in 
more detail, we note that about 60% of serious conflicts are related to either loans (22%), repayments   14 
(18%), or savings (19%), a pattern that is very similar for temporary conflicts. Not inconsistent with 
expectations, a higher share of DPIP groups are affected by conflicts on attendance.  
Exploring possible reasons for conflicts in a regression framework yields a number of interesting and 
policy-relevant insights. First, we note that quality of book-keeping is of critical importance to reduce the 
incidence of both frequent and temporary conflict with a reduction of 5.5 and 5 points, respectively. In 
addition, having an independent check on the books by a MBK brings a further 2.2 point reduction. Both 
measures together will, according to the estimate, be sufficient to more than halve the incidence of serious 
conflict, suggesting that serious attention to better adherence to such simple internal controls may have 
very high payoffs. At the same time, availability of a trained book-keeper within the group is, somewhat 
surprisingly, estimated to increase the incidence of both infrequent and frequent conflict. This suggests 
that training initiatives which do not result in significant improvement of the desired parameters may be 
of little value and may also imply that, unless a group is very mature, having one member appointed (or 
trained) to take care of the books without some external reference for accountability may generate more 
problems than it solves.  
A second area of interest refers to group characteristics. We find that groups formed under DPIP are 
slightly (3.7 points) less likely to be affected by a serious conflict and that the initial number of SC/ST 
members tends to increase the potential for conflict. The negative, though very small, coefficient on group 
age for serious conflict (and the opposite sign for temporary ones) suggests that age does not have a clear-
cut effect (and may also reflect some sort of survivor bias in the case of non-DPIP groups).  
Concerning lending and savings, one notes that having any internal saving as well as lending increases the 
conflict potential even though the negative coefficient on the amount saved per member (significant in 
some specifications) suggests that higher amounts of savings do actually have a very positive effect. By 
contrast, having access to external lending is estimated to have contributed to a significant reduction in 
the conflict potential. Note, however, that having a loan overdue (either external or internal) is associated 
with a significant and quantitatively large  increase in the conflict potential; having external lending 
overdue increases the potential by 5.8 points and having internal lending overdue by 3.3 points. This 
suggests that, other factors constant, it should be possible to eliminate the vast majority of conflicts by 
adequately maintained books and timely repayment.  
A final group of variables relates to the presence of specific benefits from SHG membership which we 
expect to reduce the potential for conflict. The regression confirms this notion to some extent. Benefits 
reduce the potential for conflict the more the broader their incidence (as for social unity, community 
decision-making, RCL, and marketing benefits for temporary conflicts). The need for proper sequencing 
and provision of a menu of training choices that is in line with group capacity is illustrated by the fact that   15 
some activities, in particular benefits in articulation, are estimated to contribute to a significant increase in 
the conflict potential. Overall, and especially in view of the fact that even small conflicts can easily 
escalate into bigger ones that may eventually undermine group sustainability, with very negative 
consequences for members, the results clearly point towards the need to be aware of the importance of 
internal management arrangements, the proper sequencing of training and lending activities, and where 
needed external intervention to resolve conflicts early on, in order to ensure maximum sustainability of 
the groups formed under DPIP.  
4.3 Economic initiatives advanced by SHGs  
The fact that almost 90% of SHGs in the sample rely on regular internal saving illustrates the importance 
of such savings to the broader strategy and to establish discipline in the group, especially in cases where 
internal lending is not provided equally to all members but only to a select few. This is the case in the vast 
majority of groups; in fact the share of groups where all members simultaneously benefit from internal 
lending is quite low. The peer pressure for repayment that results from such asymmetry appears to be one 
of the key factors underlying the fact that internal lending is in default in only about 10% of groups, in 
marked contrast to external lending where repayment incentives appear to be much lower.  
Concerning external lending which benefits 34% of groups on average, though with a strong bias towards 
DPIP groups (57% vs. 23% for non-DPIP ones), the data facilitate a number of observations of interest. 
First, a large share of groups has access to bank loans, implying that project resources are by no means 
the only source of capital but that groups are able to draw on financing from outside for some of their 
needs. While 64% of groups with loans have access to bank loans, only 15% have accessed the CIF (28% 
in DPIP-formed groups and about 18% in pre-existing groups). Further analysis will be useful to 
determine whether the fact that the much higher share of bank loans in DPIP as compared to non-DPIP 
groups is evidence of a crowding-out or just an indication of an increase in groups’ absorptive capacity 
and ability to put money to beneficial use. We also find that, concerning the purposes of external linkages, 
about 52% is used for working capital, 15% for investment, and somewhat above 10% each for food and 
health, other non-capital items (e.g. social expenditures), and with no purpose given.  
Second, even though not everybody benefits equally, most group members have received access to 
external loans. In complete difference to internal lending, in a large number of groups all members appear 
to benefit from external lending. The amounts involved are significantly higher than in the case of internal 
lending (a total of 44,000 Rs. for DPIP and 33,000 Rs. for non-DPIP groups per loan). While converted 
groups benefit form almost 50,000 Rs. in external loans, even newly established ones have, with Rs. 
36,000, access to significantly higher amounts than those outside the project area.    16 
Third, while most of the groups make some repayments, the fact that almost 50% of loan amounts are 
overdue may be reason for project concern. This calls for a more detailed analysis of these loans at the 
group and household level to assess whether the overdue loans were taken on more recently in efforts to 
expand the program, whether they can be associated with specific purposes (e.g. short term consumptive 
use) so as to determine adequate measures that can be taken to ensure that repayment difficulties do not 
develop into a permanent bottleneck that can eventually undermine not only the sustainability of the 
groups but also the social accomplishments of the project.  
4.4 The federated structure  
Even though most of the VOs and MSs were formed quite recently, the fact that these are one of the 
distinguishing features of DPIP implies that it will be useful to assess the extent to which they 
performance their functions. A first finding is that these groups offer leadership opportunities to 
disadvantaged groups as evidenced by a significant increase in the share of women from SC or ST 
households who, over time, have held leadership positions in VOs. Also, even though the number of 
members trained remains very low (and varies a lot among districts, with Anantapur having the most 
inclusive training program), the fact that about 70% of VOs have conducted training activities, most 
relying on MS staff, illustrates that they are starting to assume their function of building up SHG capacity.  
The amount of marketing activities undertaken is somewhat out of line with the resource endowment. In 
fact, due partly to their limited age and experience, the share of VO who have own assets remains, with 
12% of the total, very limited, making them essentially conduits of programs and initiatives managed at a 
higher level. Case studies of the value added through marketing activities as well as RCL and others could 
be very helpful to see how this process can be improved.  
 
5. Evidence on impact  
In line with the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and the project interventions aiming to reduce it, we 
discuss impacts on both the social and the economic sphere and the likely links between the two. We start 
with evidence on greater empowerment of women that manifests itself in greater involvement in intra-
household decision-making, trust in government officials, other villagers, and outsiders, and participation 
in village assemblies. Access to other government programs is measured directly, by the share of 
households who know how to address problems in schooling and health and by direct outcomes, in terms 
of health-related knowledge and participation in education. This suggests that women’s increased access 
to resources and their enhanced borrowing capacity did not only improve the ability to deal with shocks 
and smoothing consumption but also provided the basis for a broader social transformation in program   17 
areas. We conclude with an assessment of the impact of the program on the ability to make use of existing 
endowments and on asset accumulation that draws both on descriptive, recall-based, as well as 
econometric evidence that relies on comparing baseline with current information for panel households 
included in the sample. Not surprisingly, this impact is more limited.  
5.1 Women’s empowerment  
Women’s empowerment is measured by a number of measures relating to their bargaining power within 
the household, their trust in others in the community, and their participation in community-level decision-
making for which we report levels or changes over time based on recall information.  
A first indication for the program having made significant progress towards greater empowerment of 
women is the fact that, even though the share of households where the husband alone takes decisions on 
debt, income generating activities, and children’s education is significantly higher in DPIP areas than in 
the districts not targeted by the program, the share is significantly lower throughout for those participating 
in SHGs than for those who do not. While this could, of course, be a result of the voluntary nature of 
program participation, fears that self-selection of households is driving the result can be allayed by noting 
that for the majority of indicators there is no significant difference between new and more established 
groups.  
More conclusive evidence of a program effect is provided by the fact that the changes over time in the 
share of women who are afraid to disagree with their husband now and who are not allowed to manage 
resources independently has significantly decreased in treatment as compared to control areas. The 
hypothesis (underlying the program) that differentially improving women’s access to economically 
valuable resources can lead to greater social empowerment is supported by the fact that the reduction in 
the share of women who report to have been exposed to domestic violence or not received proper respect 
in their family has indeed declined significantly more in treatment as compared to control areas. This 
result is paralleled by a significant increase in women’s trust in government officials, members of 
different castes, and outsiders. All of this is part of an expansion of women’s economic and non-economic 
opportunities that is at least partly facilitated by the project. Trust in others also has increased 
significantly.  
Data on women’s participation and their raising issues in village assemblies (gram sabhas) support the 
hypothesis that greater empowerment of women within the household provides a basis for allowing them 
to more effectively participate in community level decisions and provide an opportunity to slowly close 
the gap to economically and socially more advanced regions. Even though the share of women who 
participated regularly in gram sabhas is only between one third and half of what is found outside the   18 
project area, the significantly larger rate of change in such participation in project as compared to non-
project areas suggests that this gap is slowly being narrowed. Moreover, apparently at least in part due to 
the presence of the project, the nature of such participation is qualitatively different from that in non-
project areas. In fact, the overall share of women (not only among participants) who report to have raised 
issues in such meetings is significantly higher and has increased at a faster rate in project as compared to 
non-project areas and among members of SHGs as compared to non-members.  
5.2 Social capital and access to other government programs  
While we have noted earlier that the effectiveness of many government programs may be limited by the 
fact that the target population is unaware of them, the outreach campaigns conducted by Velugu seem to 
have been effective in overcoming this danger. In fact, in DPIP areas, 93% of women are aware of the 
existence of a Velugu SHG, even though less than half of them actually participate.  
Although it should not come as a surprise to find high levels of awareness of Velugu, the intention was 
for these to act as a catalyst that would allow households to more effectively access other types of 
programs as well. Available data suggest that this expectation has been borne out; not only is the share of 
households who indicate to benefit from other programs significantly higher in DPIP as compared to non-
DPIP areas and in treatment as compared to control mandals, we also note that the change in the share of 
households who accessed such programs is, with 31%, 7 points higher (significant at 1%) in the former as 
compared to the latter. Further a significantly higher share of households indicate that the community 
takes action with respect to a wide variety of social and economic problems that range from the quality of 
internal roads, sanitation and access to drinking water to child marriages, disability, and access to formal 
credit.  
More specific indicators for households’ knowledge on specific issues, their ability to address 
shortcomings in service delivery of health and education services support the general conclusions reached 
earlier and, in addition, raise a number of issues. We note that the share of households who indicate that 
they know how to deal with problems in health service delivery has increased much more, and more 
significantly, in DPIP as compared to non-DPIP areas and for SHG participants compared to non-
participants. This appears to have provided a mechanism to more broadly improve the quality of services 
available at the local level, thereby lending support to the hypothesis that action by SHGs can indeed 
contribute to an improvement in service delivery by line departments that has implications beyond the 
confines of the program. Even though we do not have data on changes over time that would allow to draw 
similar conclusions for education (where impacts on enrolment also would need longer time to show up in 
the data), this suggests that SHGs can indeed perform a useful function not only in spreading substantive   19 
knowledge (as, for example, in the case of family planning) but also as a means to increase the incentives 
of local governments to provide services efficiently and in a way that reaches the poor.  
5.3 Risk coping and consumption smoothing  
The most direct evidence on the program having the desired impact on participating households’ ability to 
confront the multiple risks they are exposed to on a day-to day basis comes from the fact that a much 
higher share (11% as compared to 4%) of households in treatment as compared to control areas indicates 
that dealing with drought today would be easier than it was 3 years ago. A difference of similar 
magnitude (13% vs. 5%) is visible in the share of households indicating that dealing with health shocks 
would now be easier than in the past. However, the fact that in this case the distinction is between SHG 
members and non-members suggests that the access to mechanisms to smooth consumption such as 
internal lending, credit, and informal support by other members, may play a more important role, 
consistent with the notion that the advantage of such groups is greatest for idiosyncratic as compared to 
covariate shocks.  
Data on women’s savings and credit access support the notion that, in addition to any possible impact 
which the program may have on local governments’ incentives to respond effectively to emergencies, 
individuals’ ability to accumulate savings, together with the greater borrowing capacity associated with 
program participation, is a key reason for such outcomes to be observed. We note marked and statistically 
significant increases in the share of women who have access to own savings as well as credit. While there 
have been only marginal increases in the ability of women to borrow from the formal sector (and greater 
care has to be taken in any case because it is a hypothetical issue), the total amount which women indicate 
they could borrow from all sources together has increased significantly more for those in SHGs than for 
those outside them, pointing towards a direct program effect. As the earlier discussion illustrated that a 
key function of VOs is financial intermediation, it may be difficult to identify the source of a particular 
loan at the household level. The fact that this effect comes largely from strengthened DWACRA groups, 
rather than ones that have been newly established under DPIP, suggests that this is part of a gradual 
process which could expand with these groups gradually maturing.  
6. Conclusions and policy implication  
Comparison between pre-existing groups in intervention and control areas points towards significantly 
different rates of improvements in terms of group management and internal controls (e.g. members being 
fined for non-attendance, internal bookkeeping being of high quality). These, together with the federated 
structure, appear to have allowed groups in intervention areas to significantly expand the availability of 
credit to members and to access loans by other financial institutions. Second-tier institutions in self-help   20 
group federations were able to take on completely new activities (e.g. taking over distribution of 
subsidized food grains from “fair price shops” which had often remained out of the reach of the poor) that 
significantly improved participants´ ability to smooth consumption. This is supported by evidence from 
the household level suggesting that, even though the incidence of shocks was higher for households in 
treatment areas than outside, households were able to deal with such shocks more easily than they had 
been able to in the past.   
The hypothesis that the improvement in access to credit can be attributed to the project is supported by the 
finding that the unambiguous and significant increase in the amount which women in areas eligible for the 
project as compared to those that were not, were able to borrow both from the formal and the informal 
sector is not matched by a commensurate increase in credit availability for men. To the contrary, credit 
access for men was higher in areas not eligible for the project (marginally significant) as compared to 
areas  that were eligible.   
The logic of the project to use improved access to resources to empower women and overcome social 
barriers is corroborated by the fact that the change in the share of women who receive high respect in 
their family and who were not subject to domestic violence was indeed significantly lower in control than 
in intervention areas where women also have significantly higher participation in family matters relating 
to income generating activities, debt and savings, as well as family planning and the number of children. 
In fact, the improvements in women´s participation seem to transcend the realm of the family and extent 
to the community level: the change in the share of women who always know of or participate in village 
assemblies, who are aware of other types of community institutions, and who are able to freely interact 
with government officials and villagers of other caste or religion is significantly higher in intervention 
than in control villages.   
While all of this suggests that the project has not only improved access to credit and risk diversification 
but also significantly increased women´s empowerment, these significant effects were, however, not 
matched by increased beneficiary savings, possibly because the resources generated by productive 
activities initiated under the project are yet to mature. To explore this, a closer look at the extent to which 
the project has increased access of the poor to resources and/or enabled them to use these resources more 
effectively is needed. Even though productivity of resource use is similar between areas eligible and non-
eligible for the project, there is clear evidence that the project has helped to significantly expand the share 
of households who own productive assets. The key challenge to ensure sustainability and replicability of 
the intervention is thus to match the rather impressive performance in terms of social empowerment with 
an equally significant transfer of technical skills that would, by facilitating more productive use of such 
assets, put participants economic basis on a stronger footing. The ability to use the federated structure to   21 
provide effective technical assistance and to liaise with line ministries to ensure that services are available 
to the poor, the feasibility of which has been demonstrated in a number of individual cases, is likely to be 
a key issue in doing so.    22 
 
Table 1 Key household characteristics        
  Total  Overall    Project area only    By district  
   Non-Project    Project area  Treatment  Control    Srik.  Anant.  Adil. 
Caste composition & 
education                    
Household is SC  0.214  0.239  0.166  ***  0.161 0.185    0.106  0.228  0.164 
Household is ST  0.167  0.150  0.195  ***  0.214 0.126  ***  0.110  0.034  0.450 
Household is BC  0.446  0.410  0.512  ***  0.512 0.512    0.710  0.522  0.297 
Household size  4.336  4.108  4.747  ***  4.843 4.385  ***  4.391  4.656  5.196 
Head  female  0.122 0.120  0.124  0.113  0.166  ***  0.136  0.133 0.101 
Head has formal education  0.366  0.362  0.372    0.369  0.385    0.369  0.368  0.381 
Years of schooling of head  6.684  6.739  6.582    6.571  6.621    6.634  6.375  6.742 
Spouse has formal education  0.167  0.175  0.151  ***  0.153 0.144    0.156  0.165  0.132 
Head can read  0.347  0.341  0.358    0.355  0.372    0.341  0.365  0.370 
Head’s main occupation:                    
Agricultural self-employed  0.278  0.220  0.385  ***  0.405 0.308  ***  0.256  0.358  0.541 
Agricultural casual worker  0.325  0.357  0.267  ***  0.264 0.280    0.316  0.306  0.179 
Non-agricultural labor   0.113  0.119  0.102  **  0.100  0.106    0.100  0.128  0.076 
Non-agric. self-employed  0.071  0.078  0.060  ***  0.053 0.086  ***  0.118  0.041  0.021 
Salaried 0.066  0.074  0.052  ***  0.053 0.048    0.041  0.033  0.083 
Livestock, CPR & others  0.147  0.153  0.136  **  0.126  0.172  ***  0.171  0.134  0.101 
Household is POP  0.399  0.397  0.401    0.406  0.381    0.400  0.335  0.469 
Household is Poor  0.308  0.306  0.313    0.313  0.316    0.304  0.320  0.316 
Budget shares:                    
Food 0.514  0.521  0.500  ***  0.503 0.491  **  0.501  0.520  0.480 
Alcohol & tobacco  0.049  0.051  0.043  ***  0.043 0.043    0.046  0.028  0.055 
Education 0.021  0.019  0.024  ***  0.023 0.027    0.019  0.024  0.029 
Health  0.075 0.076  0.073  0.073  0.077   0.086  0.064 0.070 
Income shares:  
Agricultural wages  0.317  0.345  0.266  ***  0.266 0.264    0.270  0.362  0.165 
Ag, self-employment  0.223  0.172  0.315  ***  0.329 0.262  ***  0.290  0.231  0.425 
Housing ownership:                    
Owns residential house then  0.938  0.938  0.937    0.939  0.928    0.930  0.919  0.962 
House has electricity then  0.461  0.464  0.458    0.451  0.484    0.486  0.527  0.357 
House has toilet 3 yrs ago  0.118  0.125  0.102  ***  0.094 0.131  **  0.067  0.172  0.066 
House has no drainage 3 yrs ago  0.505  0.492  0.523  **  0.545  0.443  ***  0.683  0.756  0.122 
House has only unprotected water   0.229  0.171  0.338  ***  0.327 0.380  **  0.595  0.069  0.355 
More than 250 yds to drinking   0.156  0.147  0.174  ***  0.187 0.126  ***  0.157  0.105  0.262 
Ownership of productive assets:                    
Household owned bike   0.206  0.219  0.179  ***  0.166 0.229  ***  0.233  0.136  0.169 
Household owned radio   0.145  0.137  0.160  ***  0.158 0.169    0.159  0.162  0.158 
Household owned fan   0.351  0.373  0.311  ***  0.300 0.354  **  0.361  0.319  0.251 
Household owned watch   0.420  0.393  0.471  ***  0.462 0.501    0.458  0.489  0.464 
HH owned milch animal   0.208  0.174  0.269  ***  0.274 0.250    0.198  0.221  0.391 
HH owned draught animal   0.155  0.088  0.276  ***  0.292 0.216  ***  0.207  0.209  0.416 
HH owned small animal   0.052  0.039  0.076  ***  0.085 0.042  ***  0.061  0.081  0.085 
Households owns any land  0.617  0.529  0.772  ***  0.774 0.768    0.651  0.870  0.796 
Total land acres   2.844  2.173  3.663  ***  3.938 2.615  ***  1.892  3.215  5.650 
Total land value   67338  54162  84491  ***  73078 127991  ***  229788  25101 28894 
No of observations  7479  4797  2641    2089  552    890  885  867 
Note: All figures on housing and productive assets refer to initial endowments (3 years ago) based on recall information 
Source: Own computation from CESS/WB DPIP/RPRP survey   23 
 
Table 2: Schooling, health, and other public services           
  Total  Project area  Only project    By district  
   Yes  No    Treat.  Control    Srik.  Anant  Adil 
Access to education:                    
Primary school exists  0.952 0.913  0.973  ***  0.914  0.911   0.923  0.890  0.927 
Upper primary school exists  0.646  0.535  0.707  ***  0.525  0.574 **  0.563  0.543  0.500 
High school exists  0.477  0.325  0.560  ***  0.322  0.338   0.363  0.327  0.285 
HH w. kids who never attended school  0.150  0.173  0.135  ***  0.177  0.160   0.110  0.191  0.212 
HH w. fem. kids who never att. school  0.093  0.108  0.083  ***  0.111  0.099   0.069  0.115  0.136 
HH. w. kids who interrupted school  0.075  0.137  0.036  ***  0.145  0.102 **  0.053  0.252  0.101 
Access to health care:                     
Lost days to illness for adults  0.347  0.406  0.315  ***  0.409  0.397   0.544  0.241  0.436 
Days lost to illness for adults  14.894  16.874  13.924  ***  17.256  15.432   23.697  9.139  17.830 
Lost days to caring for ill by adults  0.346  0.405  0.315  ***  0.408  0.391   0.544  0.239  0.434 
Days lost to caring for ill by adults  14.304  16.024  13.471  ***  16.408  14.571   22.573  8.893  16.638 
Total spending on all illnesses  3123  3752  2799  ***  4024  2720  *  4652  2663  3947 
Child has immunization card then  0.767  0.727  0.793  ***  0.707  0.827 **  0.867  0.749  0.632 
BCG vaccination then  0.913  0.879  0.937  ***  0.870  0.923   0.956  0.967  0.776 
Measle vaccination then  0.865  0.824  0.893  *** 0.807  0.904 **  0.930  0.934  0.688 
Main problems as perceived by women:                 
Quality of internal road   0.520  0.629  0.464  ***  0.648  0.554 ***  0.634 0.733 0.517 
Sanitation condition   0.457  0.548  0.410  ***  0.559  0.504 **  0.640  0.695  0.302 
Access to drinking water   0.368  0.336  0.381  ***  0.348  0.290 ***  0.272 0.373 0.363 
Access to communication   0.337  0.445  0.280  ***  0.464  0.375 ***  0.545 0.398 0.392 
Irrigation facilities   0.297  0.307  0.294    0.330  0.223 ***  0.537 0.294 0.087 
Access to electricity supply   0.266  0.097  0.362  ***  0.101  0.082   0.043  0.108  0.142 
Child marriages   0.256  0.324  0.221  ***  0.338  0.272 ***  0.331 0.393 0.247 
Untouchability   0.172  0.312  0.096  ***  0.322  0.275 **  0.134  0.712  0.088 
Quality of education   0.137  0.203  0.102  ***  0.221  0.134 ***  0.202 0.289 0.116 
Access to formal credit   0.115  0.228  0.054  ***  0.257  0.120 ***  0.108 0.438 0.135 
Disability   0.131  0.268  0.056  ***  0.256  0.317 ***  0.288 0.398 0.116 
Source: Own computation from CESS/WB DPIP/RPRP survey 
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Table 3: Vulnerability and Inequality                                
  Total  Project area  DPIP area only    By district  
      Yes  No    Treat.  Control     Srik.  Anant.  Adil. 
Had  drought  0.420  0.455  0.401 ***  0.468  0.406 ***  0.461  0.745  0.152 
Total loss   8263  7989  8451    8427  6089  ***  3371  10567  9248 
Had death of family member  0.050  0.059  0.046  **  0.053  0.081  **  0.084  0.054  0.037 
Total loss   7595  5635  9282  ***  5052  7164    5864  4021  8519 
Had  health  shock  0.102  0.127  0.09 ***  0.118  0.162 ***  0.153  0.063  0.163 
Total loss   8711  8144  9196    8116  8223    6222  8046  10174 
Had food insecurity 3 yrs ago  0.168  0.254  0.123  ***  0.26  0.23    0.56  0.127  0.07 
Daily wages received:                    
Agric.  Males  43.052 40.603 44.449 *** 40.269 42.176 ** 46.28 31.33 45.842 
Agric. Females  25.853  25.511  26.054  ***  25.603  25.14    27.19  22.122  27.919 
Non-agric.  Males  52.163  50.787  52.898 ** 51.042  49.926    51.79  46.116  55.895 
Non-agric.  Females  32.312  31.607  32.86  *  32.403  29.082 *** 28.951 33.737 33.175 
High trust/knowledge  by women:                  
Same caste group same village   0.777  0.689  0.828  ***  0.695  0.667    0.798  0.777  0.487 
Same caste group different village   0.431  0.369  0.468  ***  0.387  0.301  ***  0.307  0.538  0.26 
Different caste  same village   0.448  0.338  0.513  ***  0.341  0.326    0.564  0.31  0.135 
Different caste  different village   0.18  0.106  0.222  ***  0.115  0.069  ***  0.181  0.105  0.028 
Different religious group same village   0.31  0.127  0.414  ***  0.128  0.123    0.24  0.052  0.088 
Different religious group different village   0.134  0.046  0.183  ***  0.048  0.04    0.091  0.019  0.028 
Elected representatives   0.276  0.156  0.344  ***  0.157  0.154    0.127  0.075  0.27 
Gov't employees    0.337  0.225  0.402  ***  0.226  0.219    0.165  0.226  0.285 
Access to information                 
Knows GP reservation for women exists  0.274  0.323  0.249  ***  0.327  0.31    0.38  0.344  0.246 
Read newspaper now - woman  0.059  0.057  0.059    0.056  0.061    0.051  0.059  0.060 
Listened to radio now - woman  0.134  0.154  0.123  ***  0.160  0.133    0.121  0.140  0.202 
Watches TV now - woman  0.300  0.301  0.301    0.306  0.281    0.286  0.419  0.194 
Knows of village development committee  0.12  0.132  0.107  **  0.14  0.104  **  0.023  0.09  0.286 
Knows about mother's committee  0.244  0.557  0.072  ***  0.584  0.455  ***  0.592  0.671  0.403 
Afraid to disagree with husband   0.256  0.287  0.201  ***  0.208  0.173  ***  0.315  0.213  0.074 
Source: Own computation from CESS/WB DPIP/RPRP survey   25 
 
Table 4: Basic characteristics of SHGs and members' perception of benefits received 
    Project area  Group type  Region 
   Yes  No    New    Converted  Srik.  Anant  Adil 
Basic group characteristics:                    
Group formed under DPIP   0.132  0.410  0.000 *** 1.000  0.000  0.335  0.486  0.427 
Age of group  4.181  3.620  4.439 *** 1.811  4.927 *** 3.533  3.573  3.748 
Size of SHG at start  13.166  13.258  13.126  12.477  13.790 *** 13.348 12.792 13.568 
Share of  SC/ST & minorities   0.361  0.381  0.352 * 0.416  0.358 ** 0.218  0.227  0.667 
Share of  BCs at start   0.461  0.502  0.442 *** 0.478  0.518  0.693  0.560  0.273 
Share of  OCs at start  0.172  0.104  0.203 *** 0.087  0.116 ** 0.074  0.207  0.045 
Share of meetings held in  2003  0.773  0.653  0.832 *** 0.710  0.613 *** 0.462  0.831  0.695 
Share of members attended 2003  0.734  0.622  0.789 *** 0.674  0.585 *** 0.512  0.707  0.662 
Any savings in  2003   0.88  0.90  0.87 *** 0.92  0.89  0.86  0.92  0.94 
savings per member in 2003   501  412  544 ** 332  466  348  401  479 
Any internal lending in 2003  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.41  0.48 ** 0.63  0.31  0.39 
Int. loan amount sanctioned                             6262  4601  6860 *** 3161  5319 *** 4220  5910  4244 
>90% of members get internal loans  0.13  0.1  0.14 *** 0.12  0.1  0.04  0.12  0.15 
pct (value) of int. loans overdue                            0.12  0.12  0.12  0.09  0.15 *** 0.13  0.03  0.2 
Training and capacity building:                    
Group received any training     0.543  0.644  0.495 *** 0.671  0.626  0.637  0.635  0.660 
Training was sufficient  0.248  0.327  0.211 *** 0.340  0.318  0.421  0.211  0.325 
Perception of benefits:                    
New income generation   0.370  0.285  0.411 *** 0.204  0.341 *** 0.179  0.425  0.278 
Strengthening of existing income sources   0.431  0.356  0.467 *** 0.294  0.400 *** 0.197  0.323  0.557 
Marketing benefits   0.090  0.093  0.089  0.075  0.106 * 0.101  0.061  0.113 
Credit access   0.570  0.607  0.552 *** 0.510  0.674 *** 0.536  0.688  0.613 
Food security (RCL)   0.116  0.361  0.001 *** 0.420  0.321 *** 0.245  0.431  0.427 
Insurance benefits   0.041  0.126  0.000 *** 0.086  0.153 *** 0.269  0.017  0.064 
New income affects all   0.613  0.455  0.665 *** 0.404  0.476  0.561  0.435  0.407 
Strengthening of income affects all   0.594  0.544  0.612 ** 0.433  0.601 *** 0.744  0.205  0.636 
Marketing affects all   0.500  0.595  0.453 ** 0.579  0.603  0.609  0.136  0.792 
Credit affects all   0.716  0.741  0.703 * 0.685  0.771 *** 0.906  0.522  0.796 
Food security (RCL) benefits all   0.741  0.744  0.000 ** 0.738  0.749  0.866  0.699  0.707 
Insurance benefits all   0.898  0.904  0.000  0.886  0.911  0.951  0.333  0.815 
Internal controls:                    
Trained book-keeper available now   0.436  0.603  0.352 *** 0.603  0.602  0.446  0.589  0.755 
MBK checks books now   0.397  0.367  0.411 ** 0.437  0.319 *** 0.024  0.688  0.405 
change: MBK checks books   0.090  0.157  0.056 *** 0.092  0.191 *** 0.003  0.317  0.198 
Quality of bookkeeping poor   0.329  0.395  0.296 *** 0.385  0.401  0.370  0.342  0.462 
Change since 3 years ago  -0.102  -0.153  -0.077  -0.099  -0.183  -0.046  -0.150  -0.253 
Quality of bookkeeping good   0.289  0.258  0.305 *** 0.254  0.261  0.332  0.211  0.231 
Change since 3 years ago  0.059  0.091  0.043  0.088  0.093  0.070  0.068  0.123 
Sanctions for non-attendance   0.178  0.240  0.148 *** 0.276  0.215 ** 0.066  0.531  0.150 
Serious conflict in 2003  0.141  0.112  0.156 *** 0.088  0.129 ** 0.083  0.077  0.167 
Temporary conflict in 2003  0.221  0.397  0.131 *** 0.372  0.415  0.079  0.491  0.630 
Reasons for serious conflicts:                   
Attendance   0.228  0.206  0.235  0.159  0.230  0.125  0.099  0.285 
Savings   0.194  0.205  0.190  0.225  0.194  0.231  0.352  0.135 
Leadership   0.117  0.036  0.146 *** 0.023  0.042  0.026  0.086  0.021 
Loans   0.220  0.197  0.228  0.264  0.163 * 0.216  0.284  0.154 
Repayments   0.183  0.208  0.175  0.159  0.233  0.294  0.167  0.185   26 
                   
Reasons for temporary conflicts:                   
Attendance   0.252  0.328  0.181 *** 0.346  0.316  0.163  0.390  0.311 
Savings   0.219  0.223  0.215  0.206  0.235  0.232  0.263  0.197 
Leadership   0.112  0.042  0.176 *** 0.027  0.052 ** 0.100  0.027  0.043 
Loans   0.183  0.170  0.195  0.179  0.165  0.135  0.181  0.169 
Repayments   0.166  0.130  0.199 *** 0.108  0.145 ** 0.267  0.069  0.150 
Attendance resolved internally   0.843  0.833  0.853  0.819  0.843  0.591  0.917  0.810 
Leadership resolved internally   0.863  0.667  0.905 *** 0.625  0.679  0.333  0.615  0.766 
Loans resolved internally   0.725  0.608  0.812 *** 0.545  0.649 * 0.667  0.838  0.491 
Repayment resolved internally   0.755  0.581  0.864 *** 0.500  0.620 * 0.541  0.872  0.506 
Access to external loans:                    
Had ext. loans in 2003  0.338  0.571  0.229 *** 0.471  0.641 *** 0.698  0.348  0.625 
Members benefiting  12.45  12.46  12.44  11.73  12.84 *** 13.00  10.50  12.87 
More than 90% of members benefit   0.865  0.849  0.882 * 0.833  0.857  0.928  0.723  0.828 
Amount of loans  39005  44004  33099 *** 36149  48014 *** 36608  32639  58309 
Main purpose by amounts:                    
No main purpose  10182  16833  2325 *** 17929  16273  6870  6938  33530 
Food and health  1965  2240  1641  1650  2541  4800  0  223 
Other non-capital  3909  2089  6060 *** 994  2648  2558  4500  377 
Fixed capital  5565  4564  6747 ** 5077  4303  2740  4063  7000 
Working capital   17349  18278  16252  10500  22250 *** 19641  17138  17180 
Share with no purpose   0.090  0.110  0.066 *** 0.067  0.132 *** 0.134  0.106  0.082 
Share for food and health   0.103  0.103  0.102  0.120  0.095  0.197  0.036  0.023 
Share for other non-capital   0.137  0.074  0.212 *** 0.076  0.072  0.086  0.131  0.031 
Share for fixed capital   0.149  0.152  0.146  0.197  0.129 ** 0.083  0.147  0.238 
Share for working capital   0.521  0.561  0.473 *** 0.540  0.572  0.499  0.581  0.626 
Source of external lending:                    
Bank loans   0.641  0.555  0.742 *** 0.572  0.546  0.673  0.553  0.414 
CIF-SP   0.146  0.216  0.062 *** 0.285  0.181 *** 0.054  0.168  0.436 
DRDA   0.049  0.071  0.024 *** 0.036  0.088 *** 0.013  0.209  0.074 
Repayments due   0.772  0.775  0.767  0.870  0.734 *** 0.649  0.797  0.935 
Repayments made   0.679  0.696  0.658  0.781  0.659 *** 0.573  0.753  0.832 
Total  dues   36555  44789  25752 *** 35397  49597 ** 33577  19025  67882 
Total repayment  17583  21647  12252 *** 16936  24059 *** 16159  14839  30149 
Pct overdue   0.466  0.456  0.480  0.465  0.451  0.478  0.239  0.536 
No of observations  3874  1243  2629  510  733  457  362  424 
Source: Own computation from CESS/WB DPIP/RPRP survey   27 
Table 5: Determinants of participation in DPIP vs. pre-existing groups 
  Participation in pre-existing group  DPIP participation 
      Whole sample  New members only 
Total initial saving by household (log)  0.007  0.006  0.009***  0.003 
  (1.14) (0.94) (2.95) (1.04) 
Total initial saving by woman (log)  0.025***  0.027***  -0.001  0.001 
  (3.56) (3.84) (0.31) (0.32) 
Knew to deal with health service   0.055***  0.061***  -0.005  0.005 
Problems  (3.09) (3.50) (0.51) (0.43) 
Household is POP  0.029  0.027  0.065***  0.029*** 
  (1.57) (1.43) (6.27) (2.91) 
Household is Poor  0.053***  0.050***  0.049***  0.019** 
  (3.09) (2.93) (5.03) (2.01) 
Household is SC  0.095***  0.096***  0.026*  0.069*** 
  (4.31) (4.36) (1.95) (4.29) 
Household is ST  0.063***  0.062***  0.137***  0.136*** 
  (2.64) (2.61) (7.83) (6.63) 
Household is BC  0.041**  0.040**  0.048***  0.045*** 
  (2.27) (2.20) (4.46) (4.00) 
Household  size  0.014*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
  (3.91) (3.65) (4.85) (3.81) 
Head has formal education  -0.005  0.001  -0.011  -0.001 
  (0.38) (0.05) (1.49) (0.17) 
Head's main occ. agr. casual work  0.035**  0.033**  -0.027***  -0.012 
  (2.22) (2.11) (3.47) (1.55) 
Head's occ. non-ag. worker   0.046**  0.057**  -0.011  -0.017 
  (2.17) (2.25) (1.37) (1.59) 
Head's occ. non-ag. self-employed  0.055**  0.047**  -0.015  -0.017 
  (2.17) (2.19) (0.86) (1.36) 
Head's main occ. Salaried  0.007  0.005  -0.006  -0.018 
  (0.26) (0.19) (0.46) (1.37) 
Experienced any food insecurity   0.003  0.003  0.182***  0.096*** 
 (0.17)  (0.17)  (14.71)  (8.34) 
Households owns any land  0.026  0.022  0.026**  0.012 
  (1.33) (1.12) (2.43) (1.15) 
Somebody can read  0.110***  0.114***  0.031***  0.033*** 
  (6.49) (6.77) (3.54) (4.10) 
Household lives in hamlet  0.001  0.002  0.003  0.001 
  (0.06) (0.16) (0.44) (0.19) 
Participated in other groups   0.098***  0.101***  0.099***  0.079*** 
  (3.69) (3.83) (6.03) (4.23) 
House has toilet 3 yrs ago  0.011  0.013  -0.034***  -0.022** 
  (0.55) (0.64) (3.53) (2.18) 
House has no drainage 3 yrs ago  0.014  0.012  -0.024***  -0.004 
  (1.03) (0.92) (3.40) (0.60) 
House cement/metal roof 3 yrs ago  -0.005  -0.006  0.033***  0.021*** 
  (0.37) (0.41) (4.44) (2.87) 
House has mud floor 3 yrs ago  0.000  -0.001  0.017**  0.012* 
  (0.02) (0.05) (2.36) (1.65) 
Total value of non-land assets (log)  -0.000  0.000  0.002  -0.000 
  (0.06) (0.00) (1.27) (0.04) 
Total value of land (log)  0.003*  0.004**  0.004***  0.003*** 
  (1.88) (2.06) (4.52) (2.82) 
Woman high trust s caste diff. vill  0.046***    -0.014**  -0.013** 
 (3.63)    (2.07)  (2.06) 
Woman always participated   0.022    -0.082***  -0.055*** 
    in Panchayat GS  (1.42)    (10.92)  (7.10) 
Woman raised issues in Jan   0.093***    0.033***  0.019 
   GS 3 yrs ago  (4.18)    (2.69)  (1.40) 
Woman knew GP reservation for   0.044***    0.019***  0.014* 
Women (3.17)    (2.64)  (1.90) 
Man always participated in   -0.030**    0.007  0.010 
Panchayat GS  (2.26)    (1.08)  (1.46) 
Man raised issues in Jan GS   0.001    0.004  0.001 
 (0.06)    (0.48)  (0.09) 
Observations  7256 7256 7256 4501 
Log  likelihood  ratio  -4290.85 -4318.06 -2322.33 -1178.44 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.11 0.10 0.26 0.24 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.                     Note: District dummies included but not reported   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   28 










General characteristics and governance structure:       
No of  SHGs in VO  11.97  12.32  13.59  10.08 
Pure DPIP SHGs in  VO  5.53  4.81  7.07  4.83 
Total number of members  152.06  154.24  161.69  140.74 
President is SC/ST/min now  0.49  0.25  0.52  0.72 
President is SC/ST/min before  0.31  0.08  0.28  0.58 
Share of EC members are SC/ST/min now  0.36  0.19  0.31  0.61 
Share of EC members are SC/ST/min before  0.27  0.06  0.20  0.56 
VO did capacity building 2003  0.70  0.71  0.67  0.72 
.. using own staff   0.08  0.06  0.13  0.06 
.. using MS staff   0.79  0.75  0.84  0.78 
No of members trained   20.72  9.35  41.73  14.98 
Had election in VO  0.61  0.74  0.89  0.22 
No. of general body meetings held   5.94  2.12  6.20  9.98 
VO assets, income, and projects:       
VO owns assets   0.12  0.10  0.07  0.20 
Value of assets   61668  208125  1104  12708 
VO lent out to SHG   0.41  0.44  0.05  0.72 
Total lent out to SHG   301157  237484  34867  357282 
Payments due from SHGs   0.45  0.48  0.20  0.66 
Total amount due from SHGs   245027  174524  95437  338126 
Share of outstanding debts repaid  0.53  0.49  0.71  0.51 
All repayments to VO current  0.33  0.35  0.36  0.31 
.. more than 75% current  0.06  0.00  0.18  0.06 
.. less than 25% current  0.41  0.43  0.18  0.47 
VO linkages:       
VO has any financial linkage  0.93  0.86  0.97  0.98 
Total amount of linkage  413371  249575  333121  672638 
SHG annual membership fee    0.90  0.95  0.98  0.77 
Amount of SHG annual membership fee    2218  1414  2525  2837 
Amount of SHG savings to VO   8945  1474  81375  13365 
CIF-SP Sanctioned   0.61  0.59  0.34  0.88 
Amount of CIF-SP Sanctioned   374976  259601  529489  396023 
Bank loans   0.59  0.54  0.34  0.86 
Amount of Bank loans   337091  245331  471072  345095 
Had any RCL margin   0.06  0.03  0.00  0.16 
Amount of RCL margin   188045  69500  211754 
Any market interventions undertaken   0.39  0.24  0.63  0.33 
Procured, value   177596  16000  98537  383379 
HH benefited from procurement   109.11  65.00  115.37  99.13 
Calculated profits from procurements   20069  24000  15196  32320 
No of observations  199  73  61  65 
Source: Own computation from CESS/WB DPIP/RPRP survey 
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Table 7: Determinants of conflict at the SHG level  
  Serious conflict  Temporary conflict 
 
Quality  of  book-keeping  good    -0.055*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
  (4.64) (4.29) (4.44) (4.51) (4.03) (4.03) 
MBK checks books now  -0.022*  -0.025**  -0.023**  -0.009  -0.011  -0.011 
  (1.77) (2.13) (1.96) (0.81) (0.97) (0.97) 
Trained  book-keeper  available  0.050***  0.032*** 0.030** 0.041*** 0.023**  0.023** 
  (3.93) (2.69) (2.55) (3.58) (2.13) (2.13) 
Sanctions  for  non-attendance    0.004 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.008 
  (0.28) (0.63) (0.49) (0.14) (0.60) (0.60) 
Age of group  -0.005*  -0.005**  -0.005**  0.004*  0.004*  0.004* 
  (1.81) (2.12) (2.22) (1.74) (1.80) (1.80) 
Received training in group   -0.063**  -0.053*  -0.057***  0.025  0.028  0.022 
    Management  (2.05) (1.84) (2.68) (1.02) (1.20) (1.03) 
Received any training  0.060**  0.049*  0.045**  0.000  -0.011  -0.015 
  (1.98) (1.69) (2.11) (0.00) (0.47) (0.71) 
Group formed under DPIP  -0.037**  -0.036**  -0.037**  -0.020  -0.019  -0.019 
  (2.31) (2.38) (2.51) (1.17) (1.20) (1.20) 
Group size at start  0.004*  0.003  0.002  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000 
  (1.91) (1.58) (1.34) (0.62) (0.20) (0.20) 
SC/ST members at start  0.035***  0.034***  0.033***  0.012  0.016  0.016 
  (2.83) (2.93) (2.87) (1.05) (1.51) (1.51) 
OC members at start  -0.011  -0.010  -0.010  0.008  0.003  0.003 
  (0.54) (0.53) (0.55) (0.47) (0.20) (0.20) 
Any  saving    0.090*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
  (3.54) (3.02) (3.13) (2.89) (2.86) (2.86) 
Saving per member (log)  -0.003  -0.006  -0.007  -0.012***  -0.014***  -0.014*** 
  (0.57) (1.19) (1.41) (2.67) (3.37) (3.37) 
Any internal lending   0.045***  0.042***  0.035***  0.009  -0.008  -0.008 
  (3.11) (3.05) (3.15) (0.87) (0.77) (0.77) 
Internal lending overdue  0.033**  0.027*  0.028**  0.061***  0.064***  0.064*** 
  (2.25) (1.95) (2.00) (4.61) (4.94) (4.94) 
Any external lending   -0.172**  -0.161**  -0.161**  0.322**  0.388***  0.388*** 
  (2.04) (2.03) (2.04) (2.42) (2.82) (2.82) 
Amt of external lending (log)  0.020*  0.018*  0.018*  -0.024**  -0.027***  -0.027*** 
  (1.95) (1.87) (1.87) (2.47) (2.96) (2.96) 
External lending overdue  0.058***  0.053***  0.053***  0.030*  0.024  0.024 
  (3.42) (3.29) (3.28) (1.92) (1.60) (1.60) 
external loans w short term   0.076***  0.075***  0.076***  -0.035*  -0.028  -0.028 
    purpose  (3.58) (3.77) (3.83) (1.66) (1.39) (1.39) 
Benefits in social unity    -0.027*  -0.026    -0.017  -0.017 
   (1.67)  (1.63)  (1.05)  (1.05) 
Benefits  in  education   -0.016  -0.011  -0.017  -0.017 
   (0.93)  (0.65)  (1.03)  (1.03) 
Benefits  in  articulation   0.078***  0.077***  0.077***  0.077*** 
   (5.39)  (5.36)  (5.52)  (5.52) 
Benefit: Community decision-
making 
 -0.010  -0.010   -0.049***  -0.049*** 
   (0.86)  (0.82)  (4.62)  (4.62) 
Benefits from line departments    0.021  0.016    0.034***  0.034*** 
   (1.59)  (1.21)  (2.74)  (2.74) 
New income generation benefits    -0.065***  -0.066***    0.086***  0.086*** 
   (5.77)  (5.86)  (6.98)  (6.98) 
Strengthened existing income 
sources 
 0.073***  0.071***  -0.026**  -0.026** 
   (5.72)  (5.66)  (2.32)  (2.32) 
Marketing benefits    -0.000  -0.003    -0.056***  -0.056*** 
   (0.01)  (0.19)  (4.61)  (4.61) 
RCL  benefits   -0.026*  -0.027*   0.014  0.014 
   (1.87)  (1.95)  (0.85)  (0.85) 
Observations  3862 3862 3862 3862 3862 3862 
Log  likelihood  ratio  -1338.86 -1274.72 -1266.89 -1193.50 -1116.15 -1116.15 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.26 0.30 0.30 0.19 0.25 0.25 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   30 
 
Table 8: Woman’s position in Household and Community             
 Total    Overall   DPIP area only    By district  
   Project  Non-Project Treat.  Control    Srik. Anant.  Adil. 
Woman’s attitudes:                    
Afraid to disagree with husband   0.256  0.200  0.288 *** 0.207  0.174 * 0.310  0.214  0.075 
Diff to 3 years ago  -0.035  -0.073  -0.014 *** -0.082  -0.041 *** -0.013  -0.173  -0.031 
Receives respect from family members   0.430  0.432  0.430  0.442  0.391 ** 0.351  0.303  0.646 
Diff to 3 years ago  0.036  0.069  0.019 *** 0.081  0.024 *** 0.035  0.047  0.126 
Never beaten by husband   0.611  0.681  0.571 *** 0.695  0.629 *** 0.629  0.625  0.792 
Diff to 3 years ago  0.074  0.091  0.065 *** 0.106  0.034 *** 0.029  0.174  0.067 
Sometimes beaten by husband   0.071  0.064  0.076 * 0.062  0.071  0.082  0.079  0.029 
Diff to 3 years ago  -0.033  -0.050  -0.024 *** -0.061  -0.011 *** -0.022  -0.104  -0.024 
Allowed to set money aside now  0.119  0.158  0.099 *** 0.165  0.132 * 0.092  0.148  0.236 
Diff to 3 years ago  0.094  0.097  0.093  0.096  0.103  0.076  0.064  0.152 
Man’s dominance:                    
Husband alone takes decisions on debt  0.213  0.304  0.166 *** 0.314  0.268 *** 0.196  0.395  0.321 
Husband alone takes decisions on income 
generating activities  0.119  0.177  0.089 *** 0.175  0.182 *** 0.146  0.232  0.151 
Husband alone takes decisions on boys' 
education 0.077  0.094  0.069 *** 0.084  0.131 *** 0.081  0.118  0.083 
Husband alone takes decisions on girls' 
education 0.065  0.074  0.061 ** 0.065  0.104 *** 0.067  0.095  0.058 
Woman’s community participation:                    
Woman knows always about Panchayat GS  0.382  0.324  0.416 *** 0.407  0.260 *** 0.525  0.087  0.361 
Woman knows always about Janmabhoomi GS  0.563  0.457  0.626 *** 0.521  0.408 *** 0.587  0.376  0.407 
Woman always participates in Janmabhoomi 
GS now  0.407  0.261  0.485 *** 0.328  0.208 *** 0.316  0.229  0.236 
Woman always participates in Janmabhoomi 
GS 3 years ago  0.367  0.196  0.458 *** 0.237  0.164 *** 0.260  0.181  0.146 
Diff: Woman always part's in Jan GS now-then  0.040  0.065  0.026 *** 0.091  0.044 *** 0.056  0.049  0.090 
Woman raised issues in Jan GS now  0.118  0.141  0.107 *** 0.165  0.122 *** 0.144  0.155  0.123 
Woman raised issues in Jan GS 3 yrs ago  0.088  0.103  0.081 *** 0.115  0.093 * 0.111  0.133  0.062 
Diff: Woman raised issues in Jan GS now  0.030  0.038  0.026 *** 0.050  0.029 *** 0.033  0.021  0.061 
Woman always participates in Panchayat GS 
now 0.425  0.173  0.561 *** 0.228  0.130 *** 0.270  0.079  0.171 
Woman always participates in Panchayat GS 3 
years ago  0.398  0.133  0.541 *** 0.165  0.108 *** 0.227  0.062  0.110 
Diff: Woman always part's in Panchayat GS 
now-then 0.027  0.040  0.020 *** 0.063  0.022 *** 0.043  0.017  0.061 
Woman raised issues in Panchayat GS now  0.083  0.094  0.078 ** 0.123  0.072 *** 0.130  0.060  0.092 
Woman raised issues in Panchayat  GS 3 yrs 
ago 0.063  0.065  0.063  0.080  0.054 *** 0.099  0.046  0.050 
Diff: Woman raised issues in Panchayat GS 
now 0.020  0.029  0.015 *** 0.043  0.018 *** 0.031  0.014  0.043 
Source: Own computation from CESS/WB DPIP/RPRP survey 
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Table 9: Access to other government programs and community activity    
  Total  Project area    DPIP area only    By district 
   Yes  No    SHG  No  SHG    Srik.  Anant  Adil. 
Changes in access to gov’t programs:                    
HH benefits from other programs now  0.629  0.656  0.614 *** 0.730  0.597 *** 0.625  0.669  0.674 
Difference: Now-then  0.266  0.311  0.242 *** 0.342  0.287 ** 0.313  0.391  0.228 
HH participates in other groups now  0.214  0.273  0.182 *** 0.356  0.207 *** 0.325  0.165  0.329 
Difference: Now-then  0.159  0.197  0.138 *** 0.238  0.165 *** 0.291  0.125  0.176 
Any access to PDS  0.804  0.831  0.789 *** 0.867  0.804 *** 0.845  0.814  0.835 
Community action with respect to:                    
Internal road  0.248  0.324  0.208 *** 0.332  0.319  0.293  0.390  0.290 
Access to drinking water  0.1937  0.2088  0.1870 ** 0.2094  0.2065  0.1479  0.2695  0.2093 
Quality of drinking water  0.1649  0.1325  0.1841 *** 0.1371  0.1152 *** 0.1745  0.1913  0.0355 
Sanitation condition  0.1956  0.2192  0.1842 *** 0.2190  0.2202  0.2456  0.3367  0.0808 
Access to communication  0.103  0.127  0.091 *** 0.122  0.131  0.174  0.127  0.080 
Child marriages  0.092  0.123  0.075 *** 0.119  0.126  0.084  0.177  0.106 
Irrigation facilities  0.090  0.109  0.081 *** 0.104  0.112  0.161  0.131  0.033 
Disability 0.063  0.137  0.023 *** 0.118  0.153 *** 0.121  0.216  0.074 
Quality of education  0.058  0.079  0.048 *** 0.074  0.082  0.067  0.119  0.050 
Untouchability 0.057  0.108  0.029 *** 0.099  0.116  0.053  0.235  0.036 
Access to formal credit  0.031  0.066  0.011 *** 0.054  0.075 ** 0.025  0.137  0.037 
Knowledge about institutions:                    
Knows about Velugu SHG  0.369  0.925  0.068 *** 0.981  0.881 *** 0.925  0.890  0.959 
Participate in Velugu SHG  0.167  0.445  0.016 *** 0.917  0.073 *** 0.477  0.296  0.564 
Knows about DWACRA group  0.304  0.764  0.055 *** 0.769  0.761  0.649  0.857  0.783 
Knows about VEC  0.272  0.735  0.020 *** 0.743  0.728  0.865  0.730  0.605 
Participate in VEC  0.054  0.150  0.001 *** 0.189  0.119 *** 0.269  0.033  0.147 
Knows about WUA  0.546  0.352  0.652 *** 0.385  0.326 *** 0.501  0.233  0.323 
Changes in trust:                    
High trust in same caste, same village  0.078  0.167  0.029 *** 0.192  0.147 *** 0.069  0.079  0.359 
High  trust in same caste, diff. village  0.069  0.134  0.034 *** 0.141  0.129  0.031  0.160  0.212 
High trust in different caste, same village  0.038  0.062  0.026 *** 0.079  0.049 *** 0.035  0.040  0.114 
High trust in diff. caste, diff. village  0.022  0.033  0.016 *** 0.035  0.031  0.006  0.046  0.047 
No trust diff. religious group, same village  -0.030  -0.064  -0.011 *** -0.067  -0.061  -0.024  -0.070  -0.098 
No trust diff. religious group, diff. village  -0.017  -0.010  -0.021 * -0.018  -0.003  -0.008  -0.028  0.007 
No trust in elected officials  -0.013  -0.021  -0.009 * -0.029  -0.015  -0.004  0.006  -0.065 
No trust in gov't employees  -0.029  -0.045  -0.020 *** -0.055  -0.036  -0.007  -0.034  -0.095 
Education:                    
HH knows how to address school problems   0.230  0.254  0.213 *** 0.271  0.241 * 0.356  0.088  0.317 
Difference now-then   0.057  0.063  0.054  0.083  0.047 *** 0.052  0.020  0.117 
Has kids who receive school meal  0.727  0.747  0.714 ** 0.771  0.722 ** 0.707  0.710  0.813 
Female kids primary age receiving meal  0.783  0.772  0.789  0.803  0.743 * 0.809  0.755  0.762 
Female upper primary age receiving meal  0.362  0.358  0.364  0.431  0.281 *** 0.404  0.208  0.454 
Female kids high school age receiving meal  0.095  0.093  0.096  0.125  0.057 * 0.086  0.041  0.146 
Health:                    
Availability of health worker better now   0.284  0.389  0.227 *** 0.319  0.444 *** 0.147  0.778  0.237 
Availability of medicines better now   0.232  0.323  0.182 *** 0.272  0.363 *** 0.147  0.588  0.229 
Availability of health services better now  0.243  0.344  0.188 *** 0.297  0.381 *** 0.139  0.667  0.221 
Know to address health service problems   0.360  0.355  0.361  0.399  0.320 *** 0.448  0.226  0.393 
Knew to address health service problems past   0.149  0.094  0.176 *** 0.106  0.085 * 0.183  0.057  0.043 
Diff 0.211  0.261  0.186 *** 0.293  0.235 *** 0.265  0.170  0.350 
Source: Own computation from CESS/WB DPIP/RPRP survey   32 
 
Table 10: Risk coping and access to savings 
  Total  Project area    DPIP area only    By district  
    Yes  No   SHG No  SHG   Srik. Anant.  Adil. 
Dealing with  drought easier   0.091  0.096  0.088  0.128  0.074 *** 0.201  0.031  0.092 
Dealing with  death easier   0.062  0.103  0.032 *** 0.114  0.094  0.143  0.043  0.094 
Dealing with  health shock easier   0.074  0.085  0.066  0.127  0.050 ** 0.142  0.036  0.043 
Diff: Food insecurity June-Sept   -0.027  -0.039  -0.021 *** -0.033  -0.044  -0.097  -0.008  -0.012 
Diff: Food insecurity Oct-Jan   -0.026  -0.034  -0.022 ** -0.028  -0.039  -0.075  -0.017  -0.010 
Diff: Food insecurity Apr.   -0.023  -0.033  -0.018 *** -0.029  -0.037  -0.054  -0.047  0.002 
Diff: Woman has any savings   0.106  0.125  0.095 *** 0.163  0.095 *** 0.137  0.199  0.038 
Diff: Woman's access to credit   0.216  0.132  0.264 *** 0.213  0.069 *** 0.104  0.050  0.245 
Diff: Total savings by woman   -275.447  -33.787  -410.225 ** 179.194  -199.582  -937.345  520.789 325.672 
Total borrowing capacity now  5349  6026  4972 *** 6754  5460 *** 7596  4235  6229 
Man has any savings now  0.552  0.749  0.445 *** 0.790  0.717 *** 0.715  0.616  0.919 
Man had any savings in past  0.073  0.100  0.058 *** 0.098  0.102  0.115  0.053  0.134 
Diff: Man has any savings   0.479  0.649  0.388 *** 0.692  0.615 *** 0.600  0.563  0.785 
HH has any joint savings   0.070  0.117  0.044 *** 0.113  0.120  0.142  0.129  0.078 
HH had any joint savings   0.015  0.021  0.011 *** 0.028  0.015 ** 0.044  0.008  0.010 
Diff: HH had any joint savings   0.055  0.096  0.033 *** 0.086  0.104  0.098  0.121  0.068 
Diff: Man has any access to credit   0.246  0.265  0.236 * 0.307  0.232 *** 0.324  0.163  0.309 
Any input on loan?  0.195  0.262  0.137 *** 0.316  0.211 *** 0.068  0.070  0.596 
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